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Religion: A Rorschachian Projection Theory
Abstract

This paper offers a projection theory of religion based
on an experiential analysis of Rorschach's human movement
response. An experiential analysis of the movement response
reveals an understanding of projection particularly appr opriate for the study of religion. The relevance of Rorschachian projection to religion is due to several reasons related
primarily to the fact that projection and religion share epistemological concerns. First, because of its epistemological
optimism regarding the knowledge of otherness, projection
provides a legitimate means of understanding (radical)
otherness. Second, in projection, knowledge of the other
occurs through knowledge of the self, encompassing the
same epistemological processes emphasized in contemporary
theological interpretations of divine otherness. Third, Rorschachian projection can accommodate both theistic and
non-theistic traditions in its understanding of religion since
projection and religion are both attempts to formulate the
nature of selfhood, otherness, and their relationship. Finally,
a discussion of the origins of the human movement response
and religious experience establishes a further link between
the two. It is due to their common origin in early object
relations that Rorschachian projection (the movement response) is most applicable to the understanding of religion.
Both projection and religion emerge from a transitional or
transcendent realm between self and other. Object relations
theory enables us to extrapolate toward both culture and
epistemology from Rorschach's movement response.
Swiss psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach (1884-1922) is
well known for his development of the inkblot test as a tool
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in clinical diagnosis. However, few are aware of the psychology of religion he began to cr eate in his published writings but
did not live to complete. Vitally interested in the psychology of
religion, Rorschach spent three years intensively studying two
religious sects of Switzerland. His correspondence indicates
that he intended to publish a book on the subject. Rorschach
felt that the psychology of religion would be his major area of
concentration: In 1914, "the young psychiatrist reported enthusiastically about his research; he firmly believed that this
study of Swiss sects would be his life work." 1 Some of his preliminary findings are outlined in papers presented at conferences between 1916 and 1919.2
Rorschach's interest in religion is evident throughout
his professional career. His psychological writings incorporate several themes related to religion. Early publications
include articles on m ythology and religious symbolism in
Swiss folklore ;3 he also focu sed on religious imagery in the
delusions of his patients. 4 In his later writings, he began to
comment on comparative mythology, the history of religions and spirituaUmystical experience. 5 Although it may be
impossible to recreate Hermann Rorschach's uncompleted
theory of the psychology of religion, one trajectory within
Rorschach's thought can be pursued. T his is his association
of the human movement r esponse with religion.
In the Rorschach test, the human movement response,
M, involves the interpretation of an ambiguous stimulus
(the inkblot) as a human figure in motion. Rorschach believed
that movement responses were indicative of intelligence,
mental productivity, and creative potential. He also described the human movement r esponse as intimately linked
with religion:
T his component of intelligence (M) can be nothing
other than the ability to create new individual productions, the capacity for "inner creation." In its finest developments we call this artistic inspiration, religious experience, etc.
He also relates the movement response to revelation:
A broadening of the experience type ... in the d irection
of introversion (a predominance of M responses) ... is,
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depending on the degree, called "inner creation," or inspiration, or even revelation. 6
Few subsequen t studies have inquired into the relationship of movement responsivity and r eligion . As psychologist
E. Bohm notes: "For reasons as yet unknown , M is correlated with the cr eative powers of the personality and also
with religious experience." 7 T his paper su ggests that Rorschach's intuition in linking religion and the movement response was cor rect: implicit in the movemen t response is a
notion of proj ection which is uniquely appropr iate for understanding religion. T his paper also inquires into the "reasons as yet u nknown" for the association of religion and the
movement response, su ggesting that religious experience
and moveme nt responsivity have a common origin in early
object r elations. A dual intent, therefor e, underlies this
paper. I t cr eates a pr ojection theory of religion based on
Rorschach 's movement response; and it grounds that theory
in developmental concerns, seeking the origins of the human movemen t response, proj ective knowing, and religion
in the narcissistic period of human development.

Religion and Projection
Psychological theories of religio n, especially psychoanalytic approaches, h ave viewed r eligion primarily as p roj ection. In Freud's classic statement, religion is called "nothing
but psychology proj ected into the external world" :
I believe that a large par t of the mythological conception
of the world, which exten ds a long way into the most
modern religions, is nothing but psychology proj ected
into the external world . . . . On e could venture to explain in this way the myths of par adise and the fall of
man , of God , of good and evil, of immortality, and so on ,
and to transfo rm metaphysics into metapsychology.8
Psychological theor ies of religion as proj ection are based on
the clinical mod el of proj ection as distorted perception due
to repressed elements of the psyche. Religion is therefore
assumed to be distorted or wrong. In Freud 's view, proj ec-
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tion is a defense mechanism, by which we externalize the
repressed, projecting only the qualities, drives or feelings of
which we are not aware. Freud also expressed a second view
of projection in some of his writings. In Totem and Taboo, for
example, he noted that "projection is not specifically
created for the purpose of defense . . . but is a mechanism
which has the greatest share in shaping our outer world ."9
The important feature of this second view is that inner
rejection or repression of a feeling is not necessary for projection to occur. Here Freud implies that projection is a
normal process, an inevitable process in the perception of
the world. Thus there are two views of projection in Freud's
work: a positive view and a negative view.
Lindzey describes Freud's two views as classic projection
and generalized projection. Classic projection is
an unconscious and pathological process whereby the
individual defends against unacceptable impulses or
qualities in himself by inaccurately ascribing them to
individuals or objects in the outer world .... Generalized projection (is) ... a normal process whereby the
individual's inner states or qualities influence his perception and interpretation of the outer world. 10
According to Lindzey, generalized projection underlies the
"proj ective techniques such as the Rorschach Test."
A closer look at this understanding of projection, however, reveals the inadequacy of "generalized projection" as a
description of the process of perception which discloses personality in the Rorschach test. In the "projective testing literature" projection is defined neutrally as a normal process
of externalization which reveals character and personality.
T he underlying metaphor is one of a projector shining an
image onto a blank screen: "The concept of projection as
used in the projective procedures is ... formed on the pattern of projector and blank screen." This interpretation of
projection, however,
may lead to a faulty assumption that the testee, rather
th an encountering something and somebody in the
world and experiencing and interacting with what he
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encounters, is face d with a blank screen on which he
projects only his own subjectivity . .. . Actually it is the
encounter of the testee with the inkblots (which are
ambiguous but not unstructured) in the setting of the
test situation, and his experience of and reactions to
this encounter that we study when interpreting a Rorschach record. 11
Thus neither the pathology model (classic projection) nor
the conflict-free model (generalized projection) are appropriate metaphors for the processes involved in the Rorschach test. The first is inappropriate becau se it assumes
distortion and pathology; the second because the blank
screen metaphor ignores the interactive reality of the Rorschach test encounter.
Freud's attitude to religion, and the attitude of most
later psychoanalytic thinkers, partakes of the first view, classic projection. The use of the second metaphor of projection, generalized projection or blank screen to understand
religion, is fa r less common , but it has been attempted. 12
However, just as both classic projection and generalized
projection are inappropriate ways of understanding the
Rorschach test, I believe that both provide limited means of
understanding religion. A third understanding of projection might more accurately describe Rorschach processes
and might contribute a more valuable tool for the study of
religion. In this attempt to redefine projection along Rorschachian lines, Schachtel's Experiential Foundations of Rorschach's Test will provide invaluable insights.
Schachtel defines projection as
that psychic mechanism by which one attributes qualities, feelings, attitudes, and strivings of his own to obj ects (people and things) of his environment. This may
lead to the actual perception or to the assumption of
the presence of these qualities in the objects of the environment, and it may help or hinder an understanding
of the object.
According to this definition, projection plays no role at all
in most of the "projective techniques." In the Rorschach test
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only a small fraction of the many processes are of a prqjective nature.
Not until the late 1930s was the Rorschach test called a
projective technique. Rorschach himself called Psychodiagnostics neither a projective test nor a projective technique.
He referred to the test as an "experiment in the diagnosis
of perception" and as a "form-interpretation test. " He considered the test a revealing study of individual differences
in perception and a contribution to th e problem of perception and personality, not a projective test. Schachtel concurs
with Rorschach's original estimation of the experiment as a
test of perception and refrains from calling the Rorschach
Test a projective test. He does, however, find tha.t projection is the process underlying Rorschach's movement responses. "The mechanism of projection ... is essential for
an under standing of ... the kinesthetic responses." Let us
look more closely at Schachtel's experiential analysis of the
movement response and the psychology of projection.

Experiential Understanding of the Movement Response
Schachtel states that the implications of Rorschach's
ideas about the movement response
not only make it one of the most important tools for the
analysis of character structure in the test; they also throw
light on the nature of the mechanism of projection.
In movement perception or kinesthetic perception, he
explains,
there is an element of projection. The subject understands the movement ... that he perceives ... in terms
of his own inner experie nce .... Thus his personal kinesthetic . . . feeling, aroused by what he sees, is projected onto the person or object seen and merges completely, without the subj ect being aware of it, with the
percept of the person or object empathically perceived.
Movement perception or projection can be bro ken down
into the following steps: 1. the individual perceives an ob-
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ject (a person, a thing, or anything other than the self); 2.
the object arouses a personal feeling; 3. the feeling is projected upon the object seen; 4. the projection merges completely with the percept of the object. T here is u sually no
awareness that this is anything other than a simple perception of an object. This may or may not produce accurate
knowledge of the other. In kinesthetic perception or proj ection, therefore, the subject perceives the object through
knowledge of himself: paradoxically, knowledge of reality is
obtained through self-knowledge.
According to Schachtel's experiential analysis, the elements of projection include anthropomorphic thinking, a
connection with the experience of selfhood, epistemology,
and reliance on somatic experience. The first three of these
will be most appropriate to our discussion of religion as
projection; all will contribute to our search for the roots of
projective knowing in early object relations.
Schachtel's view of projection involves the human tendency toward anthropomorphic thinking, the tendency to
"perceive and think of others in one's own image and to
expect and to find one's likeness in others." Through anthropomorphism actual perception of the other can r esult.
On the other hand , anthropomorphism can result in the
mistaken assumption of the presence of qualities in the
other: projection can help or hinder an understanding of
the object. Distorted proj ection, due to anthropomorphism,
constitutes one end of a continuum at the other end of
which genuine understanding of others has its place.
Kinesthetic perce ption or move ment responsivity results in a kind of knowing wherein one experiences in
oneself the sensation of movement that is perceived in the
other. Rorschach noted that the movement must be felt
(erfuhlt) , not merely named. An actual kinesthetic sensation, however slight, must be present, as if the subject
were inside the figure seen. The perception of one's own
body in the kinesthetic sensation is inextricably fused with
the object of perception through the visual data received
by the eye. In movement responsivity, body knowing or
somatic experience is at the root of perception. Related to
this body knowing is the exp erience of selfhood. Schach-
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tel associates movement perception with the "deepest
trends in the personality." T his is based on two facts.
First, only through kinesthetic sensations does the individual have "direct, immediate, physical experience of himself from within. " Secondly, "every human feeling , attitude, striving has both a physical and a mental side and
find s expression in physiological and neuromuscular as
well as in psychic processes." 13 T hus the movement response represents a profound demension of knowing the
self which is body-oriented.
This mode of knowing, in effect, transcends the polarity of self and other since it is through the self (body perception) that we know the other in the movement response.
Yet paradoxically we perceive this knowledge as commg
from the other rather than from the self:
the experiential perception of movement displays a
strong sense of otherness which tends to bracket or
suspend the more reflective recognition that . . . the
origins of such a sense of otherness do in fact lie within
oneself. 14
This is Rorschach's epistemological paradox. It grapples
with the question of selfhood, otherness and their relationship in the process of knowing the other.
Through an experiential analysis of projection in kinesthetic perception (movement responses), it becomes clear
that projection is a legitimate means of achieving knowledge
of the other, and that this form of projection transcends the
subject-object dichotomy, the polarity of self and other.
Rorschach is "succeeding thus in that hitherto impossible
task. He is bridging the gulf between the knower and the
object of his knowledge, the Ding an Sich." 15 Thus an experiential analysis of the movement response allows us to conclude that movement responses represent projective knowing, that this form of perception involves knowing the other
through knowledge of one's own body, that movement responsivity can be either accurate or inaccurate, and that
movement responsivity is linked with the deepest trends in
the personality. T he central mechanisms in projection thus
involve the self, the other, and their relationship. Most sig-
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nificant in Rorschachian projection are epistemology and
anthropomorphism. These two dimensions of projection
make Rorschachian projection a particularly appropriate
model for understanding religion.

Epistemology
The Rorschachian view of projection is essentially epistemological. It deals with the issue of knowledge of the
other, asking how we, the subjects, have knowledge of objects in the external world. Projection is "an attempt to formulate the nature of otherness." It inquires into
the relation of knowledge derived from sensory experience about objects in the external world to knowledge
derived from reflection upon those processes which
constitute our internal awareness of ourselves. 16
From an epistemological point of view, the negative view
of projection is understood as a distortion of otherness.
Through projection, Freud implied in his "classic" view of
projection, we cannot accurately know the other, for projection involves unconscious repression of self and pathological
distortion of otherness. In the negative view "the mistaken
attribution of a quality or trait of which one is not aware
in himself [is proj ected] onto others, thereby distorting reality."17 Accurate knowledge of reality or of otherness is possible only by means of identifying one's projections, recognizing their distortions, and renouncing the projections.
The view of projection implicit in the M response, however, d iffers substa ntially from the negative view of projection. First, inner rejection or repression of a quality or trait
is not necessary for projection to occur. Secondly, projection can function as a step toward knowledge of otherness
in which the subject defines the object. While projection
appears to be an imposition of subjective elements on
reality, (it) is in fact not a distortion at all. ... Projection
arises from within, yet does not distort what is with-

208

Diane Jonte-Pace
out. ... What is projected comes to lie between what is
subject and what is object. 18

The epistemological nature of projection is clear. In the
lower view there is only a limited potential for knowledge of
otherness while in the view of projection deduced from the
movement response in the Rorschach test, non-distorted
knowledge of otherness is a real possibility and projection is
a legitimate component of knowing the other.
Ptqjection is more than an attempt to formulate the
nature of otherness: it is also an attempt to formulate the
nature of selfhood. It is in an encounter between self and
other that projective knowing occurs. Movement responses
are intimately related to knowledge of selfhood: only
through kinesthetic sensations do we have direct inner
physical experience of ourselves. Several Rorschach theorists in addition to Schachtel have made this point:
Those kinesthesias which find their way into a person's
movement responses are drawn from a repertoire of
kinesthetic memories which express some of his core
experiences of selfhood. 19
Others similarly link M with a "tolerance for experiencing
the self" and with the origin of the awareness of self:
In the development of thought lies the origin of the
awareness of the self and self concept since the delay of
gratification and fantasy, M, clearly differentiates the
organism from the immediate environmental situation.
This differentiation makes possible more self-directed
responses. 20
Rorschach's emphasis on the necessity of a "felt movement"
indicates that projective knowing involves an awareness of
the physical sensation of movement in one's body, a body
knowing. M thinking is body oriented thinking; M thinking
involves somatic participation in perceptual experience.
An epistemology of the body emerges: through our
bodies we know ourselves and we know others. This body
oriented knowing may have its origin in the infant's relationship with the mother. Rorschach's epistemological para-
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dox, the paradox that we perceive proj ective knowledge as
coming from an external source rather than from our own
bodies, an internal source, is r esolvable when we postulate
that the origin of that knowing is in the infant's undifferentiated state where self and other, I and not-! are not experienced as separate. The origins of movement responsivity
and projection may lie in early object relations where the
nature of selfhood, otherness, a nd their r elationship is initially formulated . This point will be developed later.

Anthropomorphism
The ongms of anthropomorphism in the Rorschach
movement response are clear: a movement response in the
Rorschach test involves the perception, in the ambiguous
figure , of a human figure in motion. We project our human
form , our anthropomorphic image, onto the inkblot, and
we perceive that form dynamically. The human form is doing something.
Anthropomorphism refers to the tendency to think of
the universe in human terms and to think of others in terms
of one's own experience. Anthropomorphic thinking can be
a legitimate means of understanding others. Through anthropomorphic thinking one understands the experience of
another individual most deeply and most empathically:
In every act of understanding something akin to one's
own experience is felt in the other person. All under standing of others is made possible only by the fact that
the other person is essentially like oneself, that .. . we
are all much more simply human than otherwise. It is
the essential likeness of man which is the basis of all
r eal psychological understanding.21
Anthropomorphism and epistemology are deeply intertwined in projection: it is through anthropomorphic thinking that true understanding or knowledge of otherness
takes place. Knowledge of otherness (epistemology) and anthropomorphism, then are central components of projection. Otherness and anthropomorphism are also central
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issues in theistic religions. T h e two major elements in
theism 's Imago Dei are the radical otherness or transcendence of God and the personhood of God. Sharing these
central concerns makes the vocabulary of projection a potentially valuable tool for understanding theistic religions.

Rorschachian Projection and Religion
Two main points arc made in the following pages. First,
Rorschachian projection is a valuable model for understanding religion because of its epistemological dimension. Projection is a legitimate component of knowing reality, and it
participates in the process of knowing the other through
knowledge of the self. Secondly, the anthropomorphic dimension of projection makes it particularly relevant for the
study of theistic reltions. However, it will be shown that projection is also relevant to the study of non-theistic religions.

The Otherness of God
Projection can function as a step toward knowledge of
otherness. In a religious context, what is otherness? T he
nature of otherness, the epistemological question regarding
the possibility of knowing the other, and the relation of self
and other, have been central concerns of religious thinkers,
particularly Western theistic thinkers.
In the Western, theistic, Judea-Christian tradition, God
has traditionally been conceived as other or not-self, while
self is not-God. Theistic doctrines of God's transcendence
maintain the radical beyondness and otherness of the deity .
Rudolph Otto's classic description of the divine or "numinous" as the Ganz Andere, the Wholly Other, exemplifies this
position. Otto saw God as transcendent, beyond, and other.
He focused on humanity as a "creature" (created by
another) who relates to God as an object outside the self. He
called this object the numinous or Wholly Other, that which
utterly transcends the mundane sphere.
An epistemological point has emerged in recent de-
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scriptions of the mystery, the divine, or r adical otherness. A
reciprocal relationship is said to exist between knowledge of
the other and knowledge of the self:
T hroughout modern descriptions o f mystery by Otto,
Buber, Marcel, and others, runs an epistemological
theme: knowledge of "the other" is a precondition for
knowledge of self and vice versa. 22
The Rorschachian model of projection is a particularly appropriate tool for dealing with theistic religions, first because unlike previous psychological understandings of proj ection, it addresses the radical nature of religious otherness
with the potential for true understanding, and secondly,
because it encompasses the very process e mphasized by contemporary understanding of divine otherness. That is, in
Rorschachian projection, knowledge of the self is a precondition for knowledge of the other and vice versa. A process
of projection that transcends subject and object and that
provides knowled ge of the other through knowledge of the
self is particularly relevant for theistic religions wherein the
divine is radically other and wherein knowledge of self and
other (God) are mutually interdependent.
The epistemological nature of projection makes it particularly valuable for the study of religion because both
Rorschachian projection and religion attempt to conceptualize the nature and knowability of selfhood and otherness.
Religion and Rorschachian projection share an additional
agenda as well: anthropomorphism.

The Personhood of God
In the religions of the world, God is usually portrayed
in human form, with human qualities and attributes. The
creation story in Genesis makes sense of this by explaining
that God created man and woman in his own image. Feuerbach reversed this explanation , proposing that man makes
God in his image, i.e., that human beings project their essential nature onto the form of divinity. Thus theology is
anthropology and the study of God is really the study of
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human nature. Feuerbach's point is well taken: the Irnago
Dei in the Christian and Jewish scriptures is clearly anthropomorphic. God creates, God speaks, God listens, God
cares, God protects, God acts, God feels .. .
William Blake called him the Ancient of Days and portrayed him as a white bearded , stooped, cloud-swept
math emetician ... measuring his creation and his household. Others d eveloped about him an imperial image,
the exalted ruler of all men and nations ... Others imagined him as a warm personality in whom one cou ld
confide. 23
These are human qualities, or extensions of human qualities to their furthest possible developments. God in other
words, is encountered qua person in theistic thinking.
Schachtel's discussion of the anthropomorphic dimension of projection emphasizes 1. the tendency to think of
the universe in human terms; 2. the legitimacy of anthropomorphic thinking ; and 3. the profound understanding of
otherness that can be achieved only through projection and
especially anthromorphic thinking. These points intersect
with theistic religions in which the divine is viewed as other
and as person. But how is Rorschachian projection relevant
to non-theistic religions, religions which maintain that the
divine is not other, and that the divine lacks human attributes? Following are some speculations regarding Eastern
and monistic religions. T he monistic view of the divine, I
believe, can still be conceptualized in the vocabulary of Rorschachian projection in spite of an understanding of otherness, selfhood and their relationship which differs radically
from the theistic view.

Monistic Religions
Two important points must be made prior to a discussion of monism. First, the non-theistic position is a highly
abstract theological stance which is neither limited to the
Eastern world, nor typical of the "common person's" way of
viewing the divine. T illich's God beyond the God of T heo-
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logical Theism for example involves a non-theistic view of
the absolute. And yet Tillich's theology is clearly part of the
Western Weltanschauung. Secondly, the non-theistic stance is
not the theology of the majority, even in the East. T his is
well documented in H induism and Buddhism. In monistic
Hinduism one finds a belief in an abstract, non-personal,
non-anthropomorphic divinity, Brahman. But along with the
persistence of a monistic strain, theism is very predominant,
especially in the doctrine and practice of Bhakti, devotion to
a personal God who bestows grace. The situation is similar
in Buddhism. In T h eravada Buddhism a belief in God is
entirely absent. The average devotee, however, in Buddhism's Mahayana tradition has a myriad of Buddhas and
Bodhisattvas to worship, love, and fear. Nor is it the case
that only the "simple folk" are theists. On the contrary,
many of the most sophisticated religious thinkers of the
East have been Bh aktas , Mahayanists, or theists of other
sorts.
Viewing the divine as other, and as an other with human qualities, is not unusual in the East. T herefore Rorschachian projection need not be abandoned as a tool for
understanding the image of and the r elationship to the divine in Eastern theism. However, let us also address the
more abstract non-theistic positions.
In non-theistic traditions such as U panishadic (Vedantic) Hinduism th e boundaries between self and non-self are
not sharp. In monistic Hinduism the belief is held that the
divine is mistakenly perceived as other only because the
individual is in a state of ignorance, avidya. When in a state
of knowledge or realization, the individual experiences the
divine as self, not as other; the practitioner knows Brahman
(the divine) as Atman (self or soul):
The mainte na nce of ego boundaries, between "inside"
and "outside," between "I" and "others"-and the sensory experiences and social relationships based on these
separations is the stuff of reality in Western thought
and yet maya (illusion) to the Hindus .... All mental
proceses are grounded in Chitta which has as its specific
aim "I" awareness and fusion with the "Other."24
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The momsuc position collapses the distance between
self and other that the theistic position maintains. The monist comes to a realization that the divine is not merely other
but is also self, and that self, other, and all things are divine.
In the words of a classic Hindu saying from the Upanishads, Tat tvam asi: "th at thou art," "you are everything," or
"the human soul is one with the divine."
Two facets of the experiential analysis of projection
and the M response are helpful here. First let us recall that
projection is an attempt to formulate the nature of selfhood, otherness, and their relationship. While theistic religions focus on the divine nature of otherness, and monistic
religions emphasize the divine nature of selfhood, neither
entirely omits emphasis on the opposite pole or on the r elationship itself. Secondly, in the M response, it is through the
self that we know the other. Paradoxically, we perceive this
knowledge as coming from the other rather than from the
self:
Movement perception is predicated on the conviction
that what one is perceiving is truly other than oneself ... the sense of otherness.is stronger and taken for
granted .... Simply because it most clearly originates
within the self it would seem least able to create a sense
of otherness. 25
Schachtel states that the process of projection usually takes
place outside of awareness. T he content of the projection
may or may not be known to the person as being part of
himself, but the process, i.e., the mechanism of perceiving
the object in terms of one's own inner experience is generally not conscious.
Applying this facet of Rorschachian projection to monistic religions, perhaps it can be said that monists r each an
awar eness of the process of projection, realizing that the
perception originates in the self instead of coming from the
other. Instead of concluding that the perception is thereby
distorted, they conclude that self and other are one, and by
extension that self is God , that Atman is Bmhman. In his
existential analysis of the processes underlying the movement response, Schachtel found that although it is unusual,
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conscious awareness of the internal source of projective
knowing is possible:
The attitude typical of kinesthetic perception of the
Rorschach inkblots is not that of a detached outside
observor but one in which the subject experiences in
himself the movement perceived in the inkblot. The
degree of awareness of this experience varies. When
there is marked awareness of the kinesthetic experience, the subject has the feeling that he knows from the
inside how the object perceived moves. 26
He describes a kind of projective knowing in which the
internal source of the projection or of the knowledge is
recognized, analogous to the Hindu concept of the composite self wherein the individual develops and maintains an
awareness of self within himself and within the other. Kakar
emphasizes that "until this awareness of I in the composite
self and in the generalized other is established and maintained, man, Hindus would say, is living in avidya: ignorance or false consciousness."
The Buddhist understanding of self and other differs
substantially from the Hindu view, but precise awareness of
the nature of perception is not uncommon in Buddhist experience and literature. Buddhism denies the ultimate reality of the self: the doctrine of anatta (no self, no soul) is in
direct contrast to the Hindu elevation of Atman to equivalent status with Brahman. Concomitant with Buddhism's denial of self or soul, however, is an emphasis on the analysis
of the processes and structures of the mind, an analysis
unparalleled in psychological profundity among the world's
religions. Buddhist meditative practice focuses precisely on
awareness of mental processes. Intense and careful observation is applied to all experience, particularly to the mental
states and perceptual processes: thinking, feeling, judging,
sensing, etc.
Buddhism denies the ultimate reality of the self, emphasizing instead the transitory nature of both selfhood and
reality (otherness). In order to communicate the impermanence of reality (anicca) and the insubstantiality of self
(anatta) Buddhist teachings emphasize constant awareness
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(mindfulness) of the processes of perception a nd analysis of
the elements which seem to make up the self. T he focus is
not on self and other, for self and other are ultimately
illusory. T he task is to uncover th eir illusory and impermanent nature by detailed observation of the relationship between them: the mental processes of perception. This verse
by the Third Zen Patriarch emphasizes the Buddhist view
of the relativity of self and other:
When thought objects vanish the thinking subject vanishes.
As when the mind vanishes, objects vanish.
T hings are objects because of the subj ect (mind);
The mind (subject) is such because of things (objects).
Understand the relativity of these two
And the basic reality: the unity of emptinessY
Brown and Engler , in their Rorschach study of advanced Buddhist meditators, have drawn a parallel between
the practice of Buddhist medita tion and taking/interpreting
the Rorschach test. T hey suggest that both involve the
awareness of the mental mechanics of perception:
The Rorschach test requires a su bject to attribute
meaning to a set of ambiguous stimuli ... the experimenter learns something of how the subject constructs
an inner representation of the world. This task is congruent with the meditator's own practice, namely to
analyze the process by which the mind works in creating the internal and external world . ... Meditation is
primarily an analysis of perception of the world and
how ignorance of perceptual processes contributes to
human suffering. 28
Projection, we postulated, involves knowing the other
through the medium of knowing the self, while knowledge
is perceived as coming from the other rather than from the
self. Buddhism leads the meditator to investigate exactly
that process of knowing: it invites an analysis of the elements of projective knowing. Buddhist m editation is an invitation to epistemology.
In non-theistic traditions the view of self and other is
different from the theistic view. Rorschach's view of projec-
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tion, however, encompassing the nature of selfhood, otherness, and their relationship , is valuable for understanding
both of these traditions. We need not limit our proj ective
theor y of religion to those r eligions in which the divine is
other. Both knowledge of self and knowledge of other are
involved in proj ective knowing. Eastern and Western views
conceptualize self and other differently but both make the
relationship between them central to their teachings. Therefore the epistemological and anthropomorphic dimensions
of projection are appropriate to the study of non-theistic
and theistic religions.

Rorschach's Movement Response,
Object Relations, and Rehgion

What are the "reasons as yet unknown" for the relationship of religion and Rorschach's movement response? I suggest that the ontogenetic origins of both religion and the
movement r esponse lie in the narcissistic period of human
development, and that this common origin accounts for the
relationship between them intuited by Rorschach.
Several theorists have sought the origins of religious
experience in preoedipal development, but few have inquired into the d evelopmental origins of the movement response. I would like to establish the origin of movement
responsivity in the narcissistic phase of development by
showing the relationship of M to several factors which have
been specifically associated with narcissism. T hese include
empathy, narcissistic identification, creativity, interpersonal
orientation, and time sense. I believe that the crux of the
movement r esponse is in the relationship between self and
other, and that the other factors associated with M stem
secondarily from this.

Object Relations Theory

Obj ect relations theory originated in psychoanalytic insights. It focu ses on I. the interaction between the individ-
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ual and significant others or "objects" and 2. the early relationship between mother and infant. The maternal-infant
dyad is considered the most crucial relationship for the development of selfhood and the capacity for relationship
with others. The developmental period in question is the
preoedipal period, also known as the narcissistic period or
the period of early object-relations (the first few months of
the infant's life). Central issues are self-other differentiation, dependence and independence, merger and separation, sense of self cohesion and self fragmentation. "This
stage is ... the source of the capacity to idealize others and
to possess self esteem for oneself and the capacity to be a
'single one' in relation to 'the other' ". 29 It is also the source
of the capacity for empathy.

M and Empathy
Gerald King proposed in 1958 that the area of interpersonal relationship might be a "fruitful frame of reference" for a redefinition of Rorschach's movement response,
M. Suggesting that M represents "the ability in fantasy to
project the self into time and space in the interpersonal
sphere," he demonstrated that the number of M responses
is positively associated with the degree to which a subj ect
defines a problem in self-other terms and is concerned introspectively with the quality of interpersonal relationships.
Self-other orientation or interpersonal emphasis in M has
been emphasized by others as well. Dana enumerated six
constructs to define Rorschach's M: tolerance for delay, accuracy of time sense, high intelligence, high creativity, high
fantasy, and an ability to conceptualize experience in terms
of interpersonal relations. 30 Schachtel's analysis of the experiential dimensions of the Rorschach test suggests that M
reflects the subject's ability to be attuned to the subjective
experience of others. He indicates that the movement
responses
play a role in every act of empathic understanding since
the subject cannot have an inner understanding of
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another person's · feeling except in terms of his own
experience of that or a similar feeling. In empathic understanding the projection of the subject's own feeling
merges inseparably with the perception of the other
person's feeling. 31
Extrapolating from Schachtel's discussion, J. Urist focuses specifically on empathy and Rorschach's M. He defines empathy by means of five dimensions of the self-other
relationship and finds that M reflects some but not all of
these components:
M appears to reflect the following: a. the capacity to
experience others via a sensitivity to their internal, subjective experience; b. the capacity to cathect people and
experiences as alive and human; c. the capacity to experience others as whole figures whose total personalities
represent a complex integration of various affectively
charged and more neutral attributes.
Two additional elements of empathy, he finds, are not reflected in Rorschach's M. First is "intactness of ego boundaries": the subject may lack a sense of self/other differentiation in Rorschach's M, but not in the experience of
empathy. Secondly, M can represent narcissistic investment
in a self-object whereas in true empathy "the tie to the other
exists independently of narcissistic concerns." 32
Mayman also believes that M responses can reflect
either empathy or narcissistic identification. He states that
the kind of M response and the style in which it is given can
reveal whether the subject is capable of empathy or merely
narcissistic identification:
Empathy is a higher level psychological attainment than
identification .. . in empathy an experience is shared,
in simple identification the self-other distinction is
blurred or lost. In identification the ego becomes the
other, or by projection, the other becomes an externalized facsimile of the self ... Identification dissolves the
self-other differences in order to r educe to an absolute
minimum the separateness of self from other; empathy
does not. 33
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Mayman advocates a system of scoring these two types of M
to clarify the distinction between empathic M and identificatory M.
Mayman's identificatory M and Urist's non-empathic M
seem to represent the M responses that Schachtel calls "potentially distorted knowing." Movement responsivity becomes distorted when it has a defensive function; when tangential or partial data from the other person's behavior are
used to "attach meanings taken from one's own life experience which do not correspond to the real and total picture
of the other person's behavior"; or when qualities are ascribed to the other person "the presence of which in one's
own life is unknown to him or which he tends to deny in
himself." (Cf. Schachtel) Empathic knowing, in other words,
is non-distorted knowing, whereas narcissistic knowing is
more likely to be distorted. M therefore refers to the entire
range of self-other relationship, from narcissistic identification to clear perception and accurate knowing made possible by the separation of self and other.

The Origins of the M Response

Many authors have suggested a relationship between M
and empathy34 but few have asked the genetic question of
origins. Urist even commented on the importance of empathy in object relations literature, and found M to represent some of the dimensions of empathy, yet he did not
explicitly seek the roots of M in early object relations. Both
Mayman and Urist believe that M can represent "narcissistic
identification" but their use of the term narcissism does not
imply developmental concerns. Schach tel as well avoids any
genetic or developmental speculations, as is appropriate in
an experiential analysis. One study, however, does indirectly address the question of developmental origins of M
responsivity. Bene studied the effects of the relationship
with the mother on Rorschach M responses. Her results
indicated that "the ability to make M responses (in boys)
develops at an early age when the relationship with the
mother is of overwhelming importance."35 Although Bene
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did not elaborate her point, we can concl ude that the M
type of knowing, the knowing of the other through the self,
originates in the relationship with the mother, in early object relations during the narcissistic phase of development.
In other words, the form of projective knowing that transcends self and other originates in the mother-child interaction. To make a Rorschachian pun, one might say M plus
other equals mother.

The Transformations of Narcissism

Obj ect relations theorists have argued that erppathy
arises from the early period of object relations. Kohut called
empathy a "transformation of narcissism" and saw the source
of empathy in "the fact that in our earliest mental organization, the feelings, actions, and behavior of the mother was
included in ourself." Empathy, he says, involves the ability to
attain access to another person's mind. It stems from the
experience of primary empathy with the mother which
prepares us for the recognition that to a large extent,
the basic inner experiences of people remain similar to
our own. Our first perception of the manifestations of
another person's feelings, wishes, and thoughts occurred within the framework of a narcissistic conception of the world.
Thus whereas others have linked M with empathy, Kohut's
words point to the crucial element which has not been addressed: the origins of empathy (and therefore of M) in the
preoedipal narcissistic relationship with the mother.
Kohut finds creativity to be another transformation of
narcissism. In creative work, h e states,
narcissistic energies are employed which have been
transformed into . .. idealizing libido ... [The creative
product] is cathected with narcissistic libido and thus
included in the context of the self. 36
The creative person is attempting to recreate a perfection
which formerly (during the phase of primary narcissism)
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was an attribute of his own. Although the exact relationship
between the movement response and creativity remains
controversial, many studies have linked M and creative
thinking. Rorschach himself made this association and considered "inner creativity" a very important aspect of M.
Schachtel finds that the creativity expressed in the M response represents a particular type of relatedness to the
world, a creative factor in the act of experiencing which is a
prerequisite for creative production. Kohut's clarification of
the source of creativity in early object relations sheds light
upon the reasons behind the association of Rorschach's M
with both empathy and creativity.
A third transformation of narcissism, Kohut maintains,
is the capacity to acknowledge the finiteness of our own
existence. The acceptance of the transience and impermanence of objects we love and of our own selves is an accomplishment of the ego which is linked to "a valid conception
of time [and] of limits." The rare feat of accepting one's
own impermanence thus rests upon "the creation of a
higher form of narcissism", a cosmic narcissism which transcends the bounds of the individual. Kohut explains that
the child's primary identity with the mother is the precursor
of an expansion of the self late in life when the finiteness of
individual existence is acknowledged:
The achievement-as the certainty of eventual death is
fully r ealized-of a shift of the narcissistic cathexes
from the self to a concept of participation in a supraindividual and timeless existence, must also be regarded as genetically predetermined by the child's primary identity with the mother. 37
Rorschach's M has been linked with a sense of the impermanence of the self in two ways. First, tolerance for
delay and accuracy of time sense has been related to the
movement response as has the tendency to project oneself
into the past and into the future. These time oriented elements indicate an association of M with an awareness of
transience and of impermanence in general terms. Secondly, Kuhn has shown that people who produce the rare
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WM + responses* may, under the impact of grief, display
increased creativity and "awareness of the finiteness and
totality of human existence." These responses were also associated with p lacing a "high value on the past and on sequential aspects of existence."38 The fact that these qualities
are characteristic of the WM + response rather than merely
the M response, emphasize the difficult and unusual nature
of these "transformations of narcissism."
I believe that Rorschach's M response originates in
early object relations. M represents a transformation of narcissism, and it is the origin of M in narcissistic obj ect relations that accounts for the divergent parameters of M ranging from creativity, empathy, and religious experience, to
interpersonal relations, projection, and time-orientation.
The association of M with object relations is particularly
relevant to religion, for the experience of religion seems to
originate in early object relations as well.

Object Relations and Religion
Several object relations theorists have attempted to rethink the Freudian critique of the role of religion in human
life. Freud's normative vision involved a logical and rational
"acceptance of the impersonal universe of factual reality, in
which the only acceptable objects are genital objects of the
opposite sex," 39 and in which dependency is antithetical to
true maturity. The key to object relations theory's revaluation of religion is its revision of the image of normative
human life as isolated, alienated, and autonomous. Object
relations theory revises the psychoanalytic image of psychological maturity and the direction of human development.
Object relations theorists ... have redefined the problem which religion attempts to solve .... The life issue
which defines religion is not the problem of guilt or
powerlessness but the problem of separation . . . the
problem of maintaining a sense of self in relationship. 40

* WM + refers to a movement response, M, which integrates the whole Rorschach card, W, into the percept. T he plus, +, refers to the good form quality or
the realistic quality of the percept.
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The central point in object relations theory's revaluation of
religion is a revised understanding of separation and dependency, of interaction with and dependence on the other.
Rather than locating the origins of religion in the oedipal
stage and viewing religion as a projection of the father image, object relations theorists find the origins of religion in
the infant's earliest relationships to loving persons, in the
narcissistic period of development.
By viewing religious experience as "of the same kind of
stuff as human personal relationship experience" object relations theory avoids th e psychoanalytic pitfall of viewing patriarchal Western theism as the paradigm for all religions. It
leaves room for the contribution of maternal images, nonor prepersonal images, etc., to the view of the absolute.
Object relations theorists agree on finding the source of
religion in the narcissistic period of development. However,
some theorists differ in their ideas of just what stage of the
narcissistic period is most crucial for the origins of human
religiosity. For two theorists, Kohut and Rizzuto, the entire
period of narcissism is relevant to the emergence of religion . The emphases of other object relations theorists seem
to fall into developmental stages within the narcissistic period . The period of narcissism involves a gradual transition
from a totally undifferentiated phase where self and other
are not distinguished to a phase of clear separation of self
and other, a nd an ability to tolerate the absence of the
mother. Fairbairn places the origins of religion in the earliest undifferentiated symbiotic stage. Guntrip locates the origins of religion slightly later, in the early relationship of
dependency wherein personal relationship begins to be possible and some differentiation of self and other has occurred. Winnicott finds the antecedents of religion even
later, in a "transitional realm" in which true separation
from the mother becomes possible.

Kohut and Rizzuto
Kohut describes the developmental phases during the
narcissistic period. There is a brief original phase of "pri-
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mary narcissism" which is inevitably disturbed. Two parallel
and simultaneous lines of development begin subsequent to
this disturbance: a grandiose self and its concomitant mirror transferences; and an idealized parent imago or omnipotent object and its concomitant idealizing transferences.
With respect to the idealized parent imago, he explains:
The psyche saves a part of the lost experience of global
narcissistic perfection by assigning it to an archaic, rudimentary (transitional) self-object, the idealized parent
imago. Since all bliss and power now reside in the idealized object, the child feels empty and powerless when
he is separate from it and he attempts therefore to
maintain a continuous union with it.
In their attempts to preserve a part of the original experience of narcissistic perfection, the two basic narcissistic
configurations create the ideas "I am perfect" (grandiose
self) and "You are perfect and I am part of you" (omnipotent object). These antithetical but coexisting mechanisms
have been linked with religion and "mystical merger with
God" by Kohut himself. 41 Kohut's descriptions of the omnipotent other and the idealizing transference may be more
relevant to a theistic and personalistic view of the divine as
God whereas his com ments on the gradual differentiation
of self and other in the mirror transferences of the grandiose self may be more appropriate to monistic or non-theistic
expenences.
Rizzuto, another psychoanalyst in the object relations
tradition focuses not on the experience of religion but
rather on the image of God . She argues that the image of
God is formed in the narcissistic period; that maternal, paternal, and other figures in the infant's life contribute to the
image; and that the image of God and the relationship with
God change throughout the life cycle, even for nonbelievers. Rizzuto notes that it is in the context of the primary experiences of knowing the other that the image of
God emerges. Her work points toward a Kohutian analysis
of the contribution of the idealized parent imago (omnipotent other) to religion via the image of God. But she does
not neglect the Kohutian grandiose self. She remarks on the
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constant dialectic processes between primary object representations and the sense of self [which] bring the preoedipal child to form some representations of a being
like the parents . . . who is "above all" and bigger than
anyone else. This being becomes a living invisible reality in the child's mind. 42

While Rizzuto's emphasis is on the image of God, Fairbairn,
Guntrip, and Winnicott seek the source of the experience of
religion.

Fairbairn and Gun trip

Fairbairn locates the source of religion in the earliest
phase of primary narcissism: "the experience of symbiosis,
or original relationship with the mother constitutes the
deepest core of the religious imagination and is the historical source of the mystic experience of union with the
deity. "43 Fairbairn's view is similar to Freud's brief but famous speculation on the origins of the "oceanic feeling" in
the union of mother and child.
While Fairbairn focuses on the symbiotic stage of the
maternal-infant relationship as a source of the experience
of mystical union, Guntrip's work implies that the antecedents of religious experience lie in personal relationship and
dependency. For Guntrip the origins of religion seem to be
in a stage of n arcissism which involves some degree of selfother differentiation, and a level of dependency with some
degree of mutuality. Many of Guntrip's descriptions of religion focus on a sense of union or communion with the
universe. His is a monistic approach to religion:
Mature religion would express man's fundamentally
dependent nature, in a relationship of emotional rapport with and reverence for external reality as a whole,
immediate and universal.44
Guntrip's emphasis is on oneness with ultimate reality, rapport with and reverence for the cosmos, at-home-ness in the
universal milieu, and "communion with all that is around
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us". He does not describe a transcendent theistic deity . In
fact, when he does discuss the experience of "God" he defines God in terms of this universal or cosmic oneness: "mature and sensitive minds will still experience a loving rapport with the all environing reality and will express this in
personal terms as communion with God ."45 Guntrip find s
the source of religion in the psychology of human personal
relationship, yet he does not stress the personal component
of the divine. Rather than the anthropomorphic or personal
dimensions of the divine, his emphasis is on dependency
and mutuality in a universal sense, a dependency which
encompasses the entire universe in a cosmic system of mutual interdependence. Thus although he defines religion as
"the culmination of the personal-relationship essence of human living" he nevertheless does not emphasize mystical
union with a personal deity.
Guntrip's emphasis on a non-theistic relatedness to the
universe is particularly appropriate in view of the phase of
narcissism that he believes is most formative for human
religiosity. The infant's experience of being one with the
environment and having absolute power and control over
the environment has been explored by many theorists.
Awareness of dependence on the environment (or the
other) precedes any awareness of self or other as person.
This pre-personal, and non-theistic stance corroborates our
earlier suggestion that projective thinking (the M response),
similarly originating in early object relationships, is a relevant tool for understanding both theistic and non-theistic
religions

Winnicott

Winnicott places the psychological antecedents of r eligion at an even later developmental stage, although still
within the pre-oedipal, narcissistic period. For Winnicott,
religion and culture are produced/created/discovered in the
transitional space, in the period of separation of self from
other. Although Guntrip, Fairbairn, and Winnicott locate
the antecedents of religion in different phases of the narcis-
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SlStlC period, all agree in finding the origins of religion in
the relationship between mother and child , in the maternalinfant d yad. Object relations theorists agree that religion
belongs at some point on the continuum of self-other differentiation; they see it as an extension of the paradigm of
relationship.
Winnicott believes that during the narcissistic stage of
early development, the infant creates "transitional objects"
in order to accomplish the necessary separation from the
mother. The classic example of a transitional object is the
teddy bear, selected from the environment by the infant
and treated as if alive. The transitional object functions as a
symbol of the mother's comforting and reassuring presence
when she is absent. In one sense this object is an illusion,
but in another sense it is real: it has a powerfully real effect
on the child. Paradoxically, the transitional object is both
real and illusory.

Winnicott's Cultural Conclusion
Winnicott draws two important conclusions from his
understanding of the ability to construct transitional objects: a cultural conclusion, and an epistemological conclusion. In cultural terms, this ability is the developmental antecedent of all later cultural experiences such as religion
and art. T hese cultural products are created in the "transitional space" and require the capacity for play, creativity ,
and illusion. Winnicott locates religion in this "transitional
realm ," the realm between the self and the other, the potential space between the individual and the environment.
Winnicott describes the areas of life encompassed within the
transitional domain :
Transitional objects and transitional phenomena belong
to the realm of illusion . .. which is at the basis of initiation of experience. This early stage in development is
made possible by the mother's special capacity for making adaptation to the needs of her infant, thus allowing
the infant the illusion that what the infant creates really
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exists. This intermediate area of experience . .. constitutes the greater part of the infant's experience and
throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing
that belongs to the arts and to religion, and to imaginative living and to creative scientific work. 46
Winnicott's cultural conclusion regarding the psychological source of religion and the arts confirms the ideas of
Fairbairn, Guntrip, and others who find the origins of religion in early object relations. If the psychological antecedents of Rorschach's M response and of religion both lie in
the narcissistic phase of human development, we have confirmed Rorschach's intuition regarding the relationship of
M and religion . It is due to their common origin that Rorschachian projection is applicable to the understanding of
religion.

Winnicott's Epistemological Conclusion

In addition to the cultural conclusion drawn from his
understanding of the ability to construct transitional objects,
Winnicott also draws an epistemological conclusion. Epistemologically, the ability to construct transitional objects is
the developmental antecedent of the process of knowing
the other, a point which brings us back to Rorschachian
projection. The ability to construct transitional objects is the
developmental antecedent of knowing, and knowing consists of a dual process of creation of the other (from within)
and discovery of the other (from without).
Winnicott describes the infant's process of knowing the
environment:
In health the infant creates what is in fact lying around,
waiting to be found .... Yet the object must be found
in order to be created. This has to be accepted as a
paradox and not solved by a restatement that, by its
cleverness, seems to eliminate the paradoxY
Winnicott's paradox encompasses nothing less than the
question of subject and object and how they are intertwined
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in the process of knowing reality. Subject and object are
inseparably interrelated as the human mind creates the objects it finds. According to Winnicott, we create what exists,
we create the objects of the environment, we create the
other. And yet, paradoxically, the other also exists separately, apart from us. In order to know whafis outside, the
child must create a representation of that other as a part of
his inner world. Perception or knowing, therefore, is an
active, participatory process involving both the self and the
other. For Winnicott external and internal reality are integrated, mutually influenced. What is external is simultaneously created by the individual.
In Winnicott's understanding, knowing is a process in
which the other is simultaneously discovered as other,
created by the self, and perceived as other. Winnicott was
speaking of an epistemological process very similar to that
of Rorschachian projection. Projection involves knowing the
other through the medium of knowledge of the self, while
the knowledge is perceived as coming from the other rather
than from the self. Winnicott's developmental paradox
struggles with the same issue addressed by Rorschach's epistemological paradox: the issue of self, other, and their relationship in the process of knowing reality. Rorschachian
projection results in a kind of knowing that like Winnicott's
originates within the self, or between self and other, but
need not cause distortion. Both of these views of knowing
transcend the subject-object or self-other dichotomy without
collapsing the polarity. In addition both of them involve a
participation in a kind of body knowing, a somatic participation in perceptual experience. In Rorschachian projection (M responsivity) there is a "felt movement," an ephemeral body sensation. Through the body this grounded
knowing of self and other occurs. Similarly in Winnicott's
work, the point is made that the roots of perception and
knowing are in the physical contact between the infant and
the mother. T he nursing experience, the sensation of
mouth and breast, the eye contact with the mother-these
are crucial for the organization of perceptual experience
and for the process of knowing the other. T hey are also the
source of religion and culture.
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Rorschachian projection like Winnicott's transitional
space transcends subject and object, self and other, individual and environment. The realm of Rorschachian projection, like Winnicott's transitional realm is both the realm of
religious experience and the realm of deepest knowledge of
selfhood and otherness. Implicit in both Rorschach and
Winnicott are an epistemological and a cultural conclusion.
Culture (religion) and epistemology (knowledge of otherness and selfhood) are related in two ways: developmentally
through their origins in early object relations and experientially through projective knowing.

Conclusion

Rorschach's assertion that M "in its finest developments" is religious experience, becomes quite understandable, knowing the common origins of religion and M in
early object relations. I believe that M is an index of the
relationship between self and other, an index of narcissism.
M can measure the continuum of self-other differentiation. * T he entire range, from the undifferentiated perception of other as self to the clear and accurate perception of
otherness is accessible to measurement by M.
I have suggested that the understanding of projection
emerging from an experiential analysis of M is particularly
appropriate to viewing religion as projection. This is due to
several reasons primarily related to the fact that projection
and religion share epistemological concerns. First, because
of its epistemological optimism regarding the knowledge of
otherness, projection provides a legitimate means of understanding (radical) otherness. Second, in projection knowledge of the other occurs through knowledge of the self,
encompassing the same epistemological processes emphasized in contemporary theological interpretations of divine
otherness. Third, Rorschachian projection can accommodate both theistic and non-theistic traditions in its under• Relevant in this context is Mayman's suggestion regarding differential scoring of M responses. Mayman offered a set of criteria to differentiate empathic Ms
from identificatory or narcissistic Ms. (Sec t·eference 19.)
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standing of religion since projection and religion are both
attempts to formulate the nature of selfhood, otherness,
and their relationship. Finally, a discussion of the origins of
M and religious experience established a further link betwee n the two. It is due to their common origin in early
object relations that Rorschachian projection (M) is most
applicable to the understanding of religion. Both projection
and religion emerge from a transitional or transcendent
realm between self and other. Object relations theory enables us to extrapolate toward both culture and epistemology from Rorschach's movement response.
Diane Jonte-Pace, Ph.D.
Department of Religious Studies
The University of Santa Clara
Santa Clara, CA 95053
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